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Casenote

Administering Mayo to Patents in Medicine
and Biotechnology: Appropriate Dosage or
Risk of Toxic Side Effects?

"That which distinguishes man from the brute is his power, in dealing
with Nature, to milk her laws, and make them give forth their bounty."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Mayo CollaborativeServices v. PrometheusLaboratories,Inc.,2 the
United States Supreme Court considered whether it would uphold
patents on the "bounty" arising from laws of nature, specifically,
diagnostic tests based on natural laws that determined the efficacy and
toxicity of certain thiopurine drugs.3 In a unanimous ruling, the Court
invalidated the patents, which were held by respondent Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. (Prometheus).4 The Court ultimately concluded that
the processes for which Prometheus claimed patents did not add
"significantly more" to the underlying laws of nature, and thus did not

1.

HENRY WARD BEECHER, PROVERBS FROM PLYMOUTH PULPIT 227 (1887).

2.

132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).

3. Id. at 1296.
4. Id. at 1295, 1305.
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warrant patent protection.5 The Mayo decision is likely to have a strong
impact on the future of patent protection in the fields of biotechnology
and personalized medicine, particularly in the emerging area of
patenting human genes.'
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prometheus was the licensee of two patents on diagnostic tests that it
had designed. The tests measured the physiological effects of thiopurine
drugs, which are used to treat various autoimmune diseases. When a
patient ingests a medication containing thiopurine, the body metabolizes
the drug and produces metabolites in the blood as a result. However,
because different patients metabolize the drug differently, physicians
have encountered difficulty in determining whether a given dose of a
thiopurine compound is too high, risking adverse side effects, or too low,
rendering the compound ineffective.'
Prometheus designed the diagnostic tests as an attempt to alleviate
these uncertainties about thiopurine dosages. At the time the discoveries underlying the patents were made, scientists already knew that the
levels of particular metabolites in a patient's bloodstream could signal
whether a given dosage of a thiopurine compound would be either
harmful or ineffective. However, they did not know exact correlations
between metabolite levels and the predicted effects of thiopurine.
Prometheus's patent claims emerged from its discovery that blood
metabolite levels within specified ranges indicated the likelihood that
the drug dosage was either too high or too low. The claims established
processes for maximizing the efficacy of the drug. The method consisted
of administering the drug to the patient, determining the level of
metabolites produced in the patient's bloodstream, and increasing or
decreasing the dosage if the metabolite levels fell outside the predetermined safe and effective range.8
The petitioners, Mayo Clinic Rochester and Mayo Collaborative
Services (Mayo), bought and used the diagnostic tests which relied on
the processes described in Prometheus's patents. However, in 2004,
Mayo stated that it intended to market a somewhat different diagnostic
test, which would use higher metabolite levels to determine toxicity.
Prometheus sued Mayo, alleging that Mayo's test infringed on its

5. Id. at 1297.
6. See, e.g., Rochelle K. Seide & Salim Mamajiwalla, TreatingPrometheus: What Is the
Prognosisfor Process Claims?BMA BIOTECH WATCH, Aug. 22, 2012, availableat 2012 WL
3578295.

7. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-95 (2012).
8. Id. at 1295.
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patents. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California found that Mayo's proposed test did infringe on the patents,
but nevertheless granted summary judgment to Mayo, with the rationale
that the patents essentially claimed natural laws that were not
patentable.9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's decision, holding that the processes were
eligible for patent protection under that circuit's "machine or transformation test" because the processes covered by the patents "involve[d] the
transformation of the human body or of blood taken from the body."1
Mayo then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.1 The
Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit in light of Bilski v. Kappos,"2
which clarified that the "machine or transformation test" was not an
exclusive test for determining patent eligibility.'3 After the Federal
Circuit affirmed its prior decision, Mayo filed another petition for
certiorari, which the Court granted.14 The Court held that the patents
to claim laws of nature, and thus invalidated Prometheus's
attempted
15
patents.
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Patentability is governed by section 101 of the Patent Act," which
provides that "[wihoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title." 7 The Patent Act further
specifies that an invention must be "novel""8 and "non-obvious"" to
receive patent protection. The Court has interpreted various portions of
this statute in a number of patent cases.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 1295-96.
Id. at 1296.
Id.
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296.
Id.
Id. at 1305.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
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A. Gottschalk v. Benson: Overly Broad and Abstract Claims May
Preempt Natural Laws
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson"° considered
patent claims proposed by respondents, who sought to obtain patents for
a process of converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numbers into pure
binary numerals.2 1 The patents were to cover any use of this method
in any general-purpose digital computer. The question before the Court
was whether this method was a '"process' within the meaning of the
Patent Act."22 The Court held that the process being claimed for a
patent was "abstract and sweeping," with an almost unlimited number
of applications.2 3 According to the Court, to hold the patents valid
would be equated with patenting an abstract idea, which is not
permissible under the Patent Act.'
Moreover, the mathematical
formula involved in the patent claims lacked any "substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer."' Thus, any
patent issued would preempt the use of the mathematical formula, and
essentially be a patent on the formula itself.2 " Therefore, the Court
overturned the respondent's patents.2 7
B. Parker v. Flook: Patent Claims Must Be Valid in Substance, Not
Only in Form
Several years later, the Supreme Court in the 1978 case of Parker v.
Flook2 invalidated patent claims for "alarm limits" used in the
catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. 9 When variables in the
chemical conversion process, such as temperature or pressure, exceed a
predetermined limit, an alarm can then signal an abnormal or dangerous condition. The respondent's patent claim employed an algorithm to
calculate one such alarm limit value. 0
The respondent argued that the existence of "post-solution activity"-adjusting alarm limits to match the number computed by the

20.

409 U.S. 63 (1972).

21. Id. at 64.
22. Id. at 64, 67-68; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 71; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
Id. at 585-86.

30. Id.
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formula-should make the process patentable, but the Court disagreed."1 The Court indicated that almost anyone could draft around
the patent requirements in this way, which would allow patentable
subject matter to rely heavily on "the draftsman's art."32 The Court
also held that there was no "inventive concept" in the respondent's
process, and that the only added idea was the use of the algorithm.3"
In fact, the only difference between the respondent's way of determining
3
alarm limits and conventional methods was the use of the formula.
The Court concluded with a word of warning: "[Wle must proceed
cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
unforeseen by Congress. "
C. Diamond v. Chakrabarty:Asserting the Court's Right to Interpret
the Patent Statutes
In 1980, the Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty' considered a
microbiologist's patent claims related to a genetically engineered
bacterium. 7 The bacterium, unlike any naturally-occurring bacteria,
had the capability of breaking down crude oil, and thus could be useful
for managing oil spills. The respondent's claims were for the bacterium
itself, as well as the process of creating it.3 The question before the
Court was whether Chakrabarty's bacterium comprised a "manufacture"
or "composition of matter" as described in the Patent Act.39
The Court ruled that the respondent's man-made bacterium was
clearly patent-eligible, as it had characteristics which were quite
different from those found in naturally-occurring bacteria.4" It also
addressed, but ultimately rejected, some of the petitioner's arguments
against patent eligibility of the claims.4 ' The petitioner argued that
microorganisms could not be patented until Congress explicitly allowed
for such patent protection, and that Congress could not have predicted
the genetic technology at issue in this case when it enacted the original
Patent Act. 2 However, the Court asserted its right to interpret the

31. Id. at 590.
32. Id. at 593.

33. Id. at 594-95.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 596.
36.

447 U.S. 303 (1980).

37. Id. at 305.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 307; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.

40. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309-10.
41. Id. at 310-17.
42. Id. at 311-12.
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laws that Congress had enacted, and indicated that the statute at issue
was not ambiguous. 4 The majority entirely rejected the essence of the
petitioner's argument, which was that "unanticipated inventions are
without [patent] protection."14 The Court held that it would construe
the language of the statute as it was unambiguously expressed, unless
Congress acted to limit patentability in the areas at issue.45
D. Diamond v. Diehr: Adding Steps to a Natural Law Can Result in
Patentability
In Diamond v. Diehr,46 the Court again considered the question of
whether a structure or process that relied heavily on a mathematical
formula warranted patent protection. 47 The Court held that such a
formula cannot itself be patented; however, when a patent claim
containing a formula applies to a process which serves an overall
function the patent laws are designed to protect, then the claim can be
patented."
In this case, the respondents filed a patent application for a process
of turning uncured synthetic rubber into cured rubber products. They
used a mathematical equation to determine the precise length of time
that the rubber would need to cure inside a mold and the exact
temperature needed inside the molding press.49 The Court upheld the
patents on the process, emphasizing the need to view the process as a
whole.50 It explained that a law of nature, including a mathematical
formula, could not be patented; however, the respondents simply used
that formula as one of several steps in a process for curing synthetic
rubber, constituting an overall process which was patentable.51 The
Court emphasized that although the respondents used a mathematical
equation in their process, they were not trying to preempt its use.52
Instead, they only attempted to preclude others from using that equation
with the other components of their multi-step process.5 3 Although the
"equation [wals not patentable in isolation," the Court upheld the patent
because it concluded that the respondents were not trying to patent the

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 315.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 318.
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 191-93.
Id. at 187.
Id.
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equation, but rather a process for curing rubber that implemented that
equation in combination with other steps. 4
E. Bilski v. Kappos: The "Machine-or-TransformationTest" Is Not
Exclusive
The 2010 case of Bilski v. Kappos5 5 presented the Supreme Court
with the question of the patentability of an invention that described how
buyers and sellers in the energy market could protect, or hedge, against
the risk of price changes.5" When the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit heard the case, it relied on the "machine-ortransformation test" in its analysis.57 According to this test, "an
invention is a 'process' only if: '(1) it is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state
or thing.' 58 The Supreme Court, however, held that this was too
limited a definition of the word "process."5 9 Instead, the Court held
that the so-called "machine-or-transformation test" is not the exclusive
test, but rather an important clue to determining whether an invention
is a "process" within the statutory meaning of the Patent Act.6" In this
case, the Court held that the concept of hedging against the risk of price
changes was well-known and fundamental, and thus the concept itself
could not be patented.6 ' If the Court were to allow the petitioners to
patent price hedging, they would claim a "monopoly over an abstract
idea."62 Thus, the Court focused not only on the proper interpretation
of the patent statute, but also on the policy rationale behind its refusal
to uphold the patents. The Court's concern with preventing monopolies
on abstract concepts vigorously reemerged in the Mayo6" decision.
IV.

CouR's RATIONALE

In Mayo,' the Court considered the validity of patent claims based on
a biological process for determining the effectiveness of certain thiopurine drugs. 5 It extended its prior precedents that prohibited patents on

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 188, 192-93.
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
Id. at 3223-24.
Id. at 3225-26.
Id. at 3225 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
Id. at 3226.
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101.
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
Id.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Id. at 1294.
Id.
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laws of nature into the realm of clinical care and medical diagnoses,
ultimately concluding that Prometheus's processes did not add enough
to the underlying laws of nature to be patent-eligible.66 Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.67
First, Justice Breyer defined "patentable subject matter" under § 101
of the Patent Act, but explained that there was a significant implied
exception to what was deemed patentable under the Act. 8 Quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, he explained, "'[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas' are not patentable." 9 Breyer reasoned that
granting patents for natural processes and products could hinder, rather
than promote, innovation. 70 Yet he acknowledged that if this "exclusionary principle" were applied too broadly, it could sound the death
knell for patent law as it presently exists because all inventions in some
fashion are based upon "laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas."7 ' He thus recognized that certain applications of natural laws
could be patented.72
Breyer examined the Court's precedent in Parker v. Flook,7 ' which
had warned against basing patent eligibility on the semantics of the
claim, rather than on the core principles behind the refusal to grant
patents for natural laws.74 In order for the process at issue to be
patented, it would need to add elements to the natural law to ensure
that the patent made a substantial addition to the law of nature. 7 The
key issue before the Court was whether the patent claims "d[id]
significantly more than simply describe" the natural processes.76
The Court held that Prometheus's patent claims did not meet the
requirement of adding sufficiently to the law of nature being used.77
It emphasized that the claimed processes did not differ from conventional activity already in use. 7 The Court also noted the public policy
concern that sustaining Prometheus's patents could potentially

66. Id. at 1305.
67. Id. at 1292.
68. Id. at 1293; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
69. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 447
U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
74. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294.
75. Id. at 1297.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1294.
78. Id.
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monopolize the use of the natural laws at issue, preventing them from
79
Here, the Court held
being used effectively for future discoveries.
that "the steps in the claimed processes ... involve well-understood,
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in
the field.' °
Next, the Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the claims at issue
to further explain why the claims were ineligible for patent protection."' The majority indicated that the initial step of giving the drugs
to the patients-the "administering" step-referred merely to the physicians who used thiopurine drugs to treat patients, a treatment process
8 2
The second
used long before Prometheus asserted its patent claims.
to
determine
needed
physician
the
that
stated
which
process,
step in the
relevant
the
about
doctors
informed
simply
levels,
metabolite
resulting
treatment,83
for
patient
them
consider
should
they
that
laws, implying
The final step in the patent claims indicated that the doctor should
measure the level of metabolites in the blood.8 However, the Court
indicated that the measurement of blood metabolites resulting from
thiopurine compounds was a well-established procedure in the field.'
After considering the steps individually, Justice Breyer concluded that
combining the three steps added nothing significant to the laws of
nature not already present when the steps were viewed as separate
components.86
The Court also considered prior precedent in arriving at its decision. 7 First, Justice Breyer assessed whether Prometheus's patents
more closely aligned with those embodied in Diehr' or with those in
8 9
Flook, cases in which the Court reached different conclusions.
Discussing Diehr and its use of a mathematical equation for the curing
of synthetic rubber, Justice Breyer emphasized that the Court deemed
the process eligible for patent protection because "the additional steps
90
of the process integrated the equation into the process as a whole."
On the other hand, analyzing Flook and its process for calculating alarm

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

1297-98.
1297.
1297-98.
1298.

88. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
89. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
90. Id.
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limits for the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons, Breyer indicated that
the steps in the process were well-known and were not limited to a
particular application.9 1 Moreover, the steps did not add any "inventive concept'" to the mathematical application they claimed to apply and
thus were not patentable. 2 The Court concluded that Prometheus's
claims "present[ed] a case for patentability that is weaker than the
(patent-eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable)
claim in Flook."3
Breyer strongly implied that Prometheus's diagnostic tests should not
be deemed patentable because they accomplished nothing new or
significant.9 4 The claims "simply" told physicians to measure the
patient's levels of the relevant metabolite, to use unpatentable laws of
nature to determine toxicity and inefficacy limits, and to reconsider the
dosage of the thiopurine drug in light of the law of nature. 95 The Court
emphasized that all of these steps are routine, well-known, and regularly
used in the field."
Justice Breyer also discussed the case from a public policy standpoint,
indicating that the Court had previously focused on the concern that
patent law should not hinder potential discovery by monopolizing the
future use of natural laws.9 7 He acknowledged competing concerns
associated with patent protection-patents can serve both as a reward
that can encourage discovery and also as an overly broad protection to
natural laws that can "foreclose[U more future invention than the
underlying discovery could reasonably justify."9 8 The Court explained
that Prometheus's patent claims told physicians to consider patient's
metabolite levels in light of the range they described, thus impacting the
doctor's treatment decision. 99 These patent claims could threaten future
development of other treatment recommendations that would combine
the correlations described by Prometheus with newly-discovered features
of metabolite levels and individual patient traits. 100 Thus, the
language of the patent claims was too general, threatening to foreclose

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1299.
Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
Id.
Id. at 1299-1300.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id. at 1302.
Id.
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future developments in the area even if they purported to measure
1 1
metabolite levels in different ways. "
Finally, the Court considered several arguments that Prometheus and
the lower courts made in favor of patent protection, but rejected each
one.1" 2 First, the Federal Circuit had explained that the processes
were eligible for patent protection because, under Benson's "machine-ortransformation test," they involved a transformation of the human body
by the administering of a drug and the transformation of the blood
0
through an analysis to determine the levels of resulting metabolites.1 '
However, the Supreme Court indicated that the process could be
completed without transformation if science would develop a new method
for measuring metabolite levels. 10 4 Moreover, according to the Court,
the "machine-or-transformation test" could not overcome the exclusion05
ary principle for patents on laws of nature.
The Court also considered Prometheus's argument that its claims
embodied narrow and specific laws of nature, and that its patents should
0 6 However, Justice Breyer countered this
be validated on that basis."
argument with the assertion that even a patent on a narrow law of
07 Prometheus also argued that
nature could hamper future research.
any addition to a statement of a law of nature should transform it into
Yet Justice Breyer indicata patent-worthy application of that law.'
patenting natural laws a
on
prohibition
ed that this could make the
0 9 Prometheus also wielded a public policy argument;
"dead letter."
claiming that a lack of patent coverage would inhibit medical research,
However, the Court
especially in the area of diagnostic tests.'
suggest a contrary
easily
as
just
could
claimed that policy considerations
discoveries of
whether
to
as
open
question
response."' It left the

101.

Id. at 1303.

102. Id.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Furthermore, Justice Breyer noted that earlier cases did not differentiate
among varying laws of nature on the basis of their narrowness, but instead recognized a
"bright-line prohibition" against patents on natural laws. rd.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1304.
111. Id. For example, Justice Breyer cited assertions offered by a number of medical
authorities that claimed that issuing patents for the body's own responses to illness and
medication could impede physicians' ability to provide quality medical care. He concluded
that patent protection must always balance competing concerns of rewarding innovation
with monetary incentives while not promoting so much exclusivity as to impede the use
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natural laws related to medical diagnoses deserved increased patent
protection for policy reasons."'
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Mayo opinion"' immediately impacted subsequent patent cases
before the Court. Although in several cases it led to the Court's rejection
of particular patents, skillful drafting strategies may help patent claims
survive and thrive even after Mayo." 4 The decision is likely to curtail
patent protection most notably in the field of personalized medicine,
which focuses on patients' individual medical needs and proposes
treatment regimens accordingly." 5 Although the development of
personalized medicine could foreseeably be hindered, the decision may
also be instrumental in reining in rising healthcare costs by expanding
6
availability of treatment options.1
A. Subsequent Interpretationof Mayo and Impact on Later Patent
Decisions
A mere six days after the Court decided Mayo, it remanded a case that
concerned gene patents to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
for further consideration in light of the Mayo opinion." 7 In the case,
below named Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office," 8 the Federal Circuit declared isolated DNA
sequences that helped predict an individual's predisposition to developing certain breast and ovarian cancers to be patent-eligible, over the
plaintiff's § 101 challenge." 9 Mutations in the sequences, known as
the BRCA genes, have been known to substantially increase a woman's
lifetime risk of developing these cancers. 20 Diagnostic tests used to
determine whether a woman carries one of the gene mutations are

and flow of information. Id. at 1304-05.
112. Id. at 1305.
113. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
114. See, e.g., Seide & Mamajiwalla, supra note 6.
115. Id.
116. See Anne Paxton, By Zeus! Prometheus Ruling Checks Patents, COLLEGE Op
AMERICAN PATHOLOGISTS (June 2012), httpJ/www.cap.org (follow "Reference Resources and
Publications" hyperlink; then click "CAP Today" hyperlink; then click "2012 Articles"
hyperlink and locate June 2012 articles).
117. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
118. 653 F.3d 1329 (2011).
119. Id. at 1334; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
120. Ass'n for MolecularPathology, 653 F.3d at 1339.
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important because they can help her evaluate her risks and options,
2
including the potential need for preventive surgery.' '
On remand, the Federal Circuit held that the isolated DNA sequences
were man-made and the products of human ingenuity-thus, it held that
22
Mayo's "law of nature" exception to patent eligibility did not apply.'
Nevertheless, the case will likely be reheard by the Federal Circuit en
banc or by the Supreme Court, indicating that the decision is still
heavily disputed.'"
Furthermore, Mayo has since been interpreted as holding that
patentability based on subject matter is the threshold test for determinM
In one case,
ing patent validity under § 101 of the Patent Act."
treatment
therapeutic
of
choice
the
patents for systems governing
precethis
under
overturned
were
regiments for certain diseases
matter
subject
patent-ineligible
dent-the systems were considered
125
a threshold test.
under the court's interpretation of Mayo as creating
However, not all related methods have been deemed unpatentable under
this precedent. For instance, in another case, claims on particular
methods for selecting infant immunization schedules passed the
12
The decision is also expected to impact
threshold test under Mayo.
other forms of patent protection outside the medical realm, including
software patents, making it incumbent on attorneys who specialize in

121. Id.
122. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
123. See Dennis Crouch, Gene PatentDebate Continues:Federal CircuitFindsIsolated
Human Genes Patentable, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Aug. 16, 2012), http:/www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2012/08/gene-patent-debate-continues-federal-circuit-finds-isolated-human-genespatentable.html. See also Andrew Bowman, Genes 101: Are Human Genes Patentable
Subject Matter?, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15 (Summer 2012) (suggesting that Mayo and other
cases indicate that isolated human genes are not eligible for patent protection); Michael
Samardzija & Karthika Perumal, On Remand, Federal CircuitSpreads Mayo on Myriad,
28 No. 9 WESTLAW J. PHARM. 13 (Oct. 15, 2012) (discussing the remanded decision and the

varieties of patent claims that are more likely to withstand challenge after Mayo and

Myriad).
124. SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51-52
(D.D.C. 2012); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
125. SmartGene, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d at 51-52; see also Nathan A. Reed, A New Metric
to Determine Patent Eligible Subject Matter for Medical Methods, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED.
& L. 321 (Winter 2012) (indicating ways to approach the subject-matter eligibility question
for biotechnology claims arising post-Mayo).
126. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, Civ. No. WDQ-04-2607, 2012 WL
3264941, at *1, *5 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2012).
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any area of intellectual property to be aware of its possible consequences
for their practices.12 7
It is not yet fully clear which claims will pass muster under Mayo-in
fact, for many, the decision "raises more questions than it answers."' 28
Perhaps the most troubling part of the opinion was Justice Breyer's
insistence that patent-eligible claims must add significantly more to
natural laws and possess "enough" originality; yet the decision never
indicated precisely what "enough" means. 12 9 Moreover, Mayo could
allow defendants accused of patent infringement to raise "patentable
subject matter" defenses not previously contemplated before the
130
decision.
B. The "Draftsman'sArt": Drafting Strategies for Patent Counsel in
the Wake of Mayo
Attorneys who encounter patent claims in the course of their practice
should understand the impact that Mayo is likely to have on drafting
claims.' 3 '
Counsel should produce claims with "varying levels of
detail" to increase the chances that at least some of the claims will
survive any patent eligibility challenges or litigation that may ensue. 132 This process should be used until the Court's precedents set
more defined parameters for establishing patents on methods or
processes, like Prometheus's method claims. 133 Moreover, this strategy
should be a familiar one, as it reflects "the current practice of including
claims of varying scope to enhance the prospect of ensnaring infringers
yet overcoming novelty or obviousness challenges. "13' Nevertheless,
patent counsel should be wary of drafting claims that are so broad as to
monopolize laws of nature; instead, the application of the natural laws

127. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C-12-1233 EMC, 2012 WL
3985118, at *1, *20 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012) (holding that plaintiffs invention for
facilitating "e-commerce price selection and optimization" was patent-ineligible because it
represented an abstract idea); see also Michael J. Malecek & Kenneth M. Maikish, The
Prometheus Effect on Software Patents,24 No. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 5 (June
2012) (indicating that software patent claims broken down into their constituent elements
may be more vulnerable to challenge under 35 U.S.C. § 101 after Mayo, because they often
contain "mental step[s]" and claim methods for performing different steps on a computer).
128. Bernard Chao, ModeratingMayo, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 82, 82 (2012).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 90-91.
131. See Lynn C. Tyler & Peter Zura, IP Litigation:A Quarterly Update, 9 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 45, 46-47 (Spring-Summer 2012).
132. Id. at 46.
133. Id.
134. Id.

2013]

MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES

587

must be clear and limited.'3 5 If the claimed application of a particular
law or abstract idea is especially broad, it could be worthwhile to pursue
multiple patents for multiple applications of the law.'36
Another strategy would be to incorporate the underlying law of nature
into the patent claim without stating it explicitly in a "wherein" clause,
as Prometheus did.137 Additionally, the inclusion of any novel and
non-obvious elements in the process claim, whether these include drug
dosage forms, routes of administration, or reagents, may amount to an
"inventive concept" as required by Mayo. 3 ' A disclosure of any and all
predicted uses of the natural law-for example, if multiple diseases could
be treated based on the mechanisms of a drug within the body-should
also be included in the patent claim.'39 Counsel may consider keeping
at least one patent application pending for as long as possible in order
to adapt new claims as needed.'4 0
Moreover, challenges to current or pending patents can be expected
Businesses and research
under the exacting Mayo standard. 4 '
are advised to consult with
affected
be
could
patents
whose
organizations
assets from being
present
their
of
value
the
attorneys to prevent
4 2 These companies should also be aware of various
compromised.'
claim drafting strategies to use in any pending patent applications. 143

135. Id. at 46-47.
136. Id. at 47.
137. Seide & Mamajiwalla, supra note 6.
138. Id. Seide and Mamajiwalla elaborate on how the novelty requirement will affect
patent claims:
Claims to such methods now must include novel dosing regimens, novel and
unobvious reagents, or combinations of reagents that otherwise would not be
obvious to use in combination. If possible, patentees should consider incorporating
into the claim novel devices for administration of the drug or even novel and
unobvious routes of administration or dosage forms, which may lead to an
unexpected increase in bioavailability at a lower dose and hence reduce adverse
events.
Id. The authors also include possible redrafted versions of all of Prometheus's method

claims. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Mandy Wilson Decker, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Gives Rise to New
Challengesfor PatentProtection in the Field of PersonalizedMedicine and Beyond, STITES
& HARBISON, PLLC NEWS & EVENTS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.stites.com/news/657/u-s-

supreme-court-decision-gives-rise-to-new-challenges-for-patent-protectionin-the-feld-ofpersonalized-medicine-and-beyond.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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C. Effects on PersonalizedMedicine and Healthcare Costs
"Personalized medicine promises to be one of the most important
human developments since the tragic Greek figure Prometheus brought
fire to humanity."'" Personalized medicine, also called individualized
medicine, is an emerging field which focuses on individual metabolic and
physiological differences among patients in determining treatment
regimens. 14 It depends on genotyping and other methods to determine
which patients may benefit most from a particular treatment option for
a particular disease.'
Such individualized treatment is likely to
improve treatment efficacy while decreasing healthcare costs. 47
Personalized medicine has grown exponentially in the last decade; the
market for this emergent field in the United States alone was estimated
at $225 billion in 2009 and is expected to expand further in the next
several years. 14 Thus, the financial stakes cannot be ignored, espe4
cially if the potential decrease in healthcare costs is also considered. 1
However, this field relies heavily on the development of diagnostic tests
like those of Prometheus, and the Mayo precedent is likely to overturn
some of the patents on these tests. 5 ' In fact, when interpreted
broadly, "the correlation between a particular genotype and which
medical regimen is likely to be efficacious for a particular patient can be
construed to be a law of nature, and the diagnostic test would merely
instruct the practitioner to apply that law in any given case."' 5 ' It
diagnostic methods are unlikely to receive patent protection, it may
become difficult to fund this emergent, yet unquestionably important,
field. 5 '
However, although personalized medicine is expected to reduce
healthcare costs, patent protection itself can increase them.'6 ' For
144. Wayne Keown, How Prometheus Pecks the Liver out of Personalized Medicine,
FURMAN, GREGORY, & DEPTULA BLOG (Mar. 23, 2012), httpj/www.fgd-law.com940/.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Seide & Mamajiwalla, supra note 6.
149. Id.
150. Keown, supra note 143.

151. Id.
152. Id. See also Denise DeFranco, Mayo: A Force to Be Reckoned With, 4 No. 6
LANDSLIDE 24 (July/Aug. 2012). DeFranco notes a possible internal inconsistency in the
Mayo rationale as it relates to discoveries in personalized medicine: "Taken to its extreme,
the court's decision suggests that if you discover that a drug treats a disease you can get
a patent on that discovery, but if you discover the precise dosage amounts that treat the
disease you may not get a patent on that discovery." Id. at 27.
153. Paxton, supra note 115.
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example, if a laboratory, via a patent, owns the exclusive rights to
administer a certain test, patients are forced to obtain the tests at that
laboratory's prices and are precluded from obtaining a second opinion. 54 Thus, the cost of lab testing could rise substantially if patent
protection became excessive.' 55 Moreover, if a particular test has a
sole provider, there is no peer review process and patients have no
another facility if desired, which could
option to receive the test from
156
reduce the quality of care.
VI.

CONCLUSION

One of the Court's main concerns in Mayo was preventing a monopoly
on the laws of nature which would both hinder the flow of information
and unnecessarily increase expense,"' and the Mayo precedent is
likely to prevent this undesirable result. Patients are likely to have
greater access to more and cheaper diagnostic and treatment options and
will be able to "shop around" for the type of care that best meets both
their health needs and budgets to a greater extent. In turn, this could
prove particularly beneficial for those who still lack adequate health
insurance. With appropriate claim drafting strategies, some of the
decision's threat to patent protection, especially in personalized medicine
and biotechnology, may be curtailed. Nevertheless, only time will tell
whether Mayo will significantly hinder research efforts by sharply
reducing patent protection-which could be a toxic side effect indeed.
LAUREN MILLER

154. Id.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1289, 1304-05
(2012).

